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crises. While the tenets of the Libya strategy could apply to other humanitarian crises,
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Abstract
Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) is the latest example of how a
limited-means military intervention in a humanitarian crisis can stop the
murder of innocent civilians. Proponents of intervention in the name of
"responsibility to protect" (R2P) have stated that the air campaign strategy used in Libya could be the model for future U.S. military engagement
overseas. This begs the question of when the United States should insert
itself militarily into a humanitarian crisis. For instance, Syria is a potential candidate for military intervention. The following article takes the
reasons for military intervention in Libya, as explained by President
Obama in his address to the nation in March 2011, and creates criteria for
future humanitarian military intervention. By defining and applying these
criteria to a humanitarian crisis such as Syria, it is revealed that the Libya
campaign model does not fit Syria now, nor does the model provide a panacea for all future humanitarian crises. While the tenets of the Libya strategy could apply to other humanitarian crises, proponents for military
intervention must meet the criteria laid out in this article, or the United
States may find itself committed to a futile air campaign unable to achieve
the nation's strategic objectives.

Introduction
Officials from the Obama administration have stated that the strategy
used in Libya is the model for future U.S. military engagements overseas.2
Taking a limited means approach, the administration mobilized a military
coalition, which executed a successful air campaign using coordinated
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missile and air attacks to help opposition ground forces overthrow General Muammar Gadhafi. The success in Libya, however, has created a policy and strategy dilemma for the United States as political and military
leaders try to determine when military intervention in a future humanitarian crisis is the best option. While military force worked in Libya, this
limited means approach may not be effective in every "responsibility to
protect" (R2P) scenario, such as in Syria, which is going through similar
civil strife issues. Proponents for military intervention in the name of R2P
must first apply the criteria developed for Libya and meet each one before
endorsing military force in the next humanitarian crisis. Definition of the
Libya strategy, and application of its criteria to the predicament in Syria,
reveals that the Libyan campaign model does not provide a panacea for all
humanitarian crises.

The Libya Criteria
In President Obama's March 28, 2011 speech to the American people, the
President laid out the reasons he chose to take military action in Libya
and stop the violence against innocent civilians. President Obama said,
"We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate
for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had
the ability to stop Qaddafi's forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground." The President further stated that he "authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council
Resolution 1973."3
From the President's speech, his stated reasons for intervention in Libya
can be interpreted into a set of criteria for U.S. military intervention in
future humanitarian crises. Based on the reasons noted in his speech, the
following criteria were developed, by the author, and should be used by
U.S. leadership before committing U.S. forces to intervene militarily in
future humanitarian crises. The developed criteria are: 1) an international
mandate; 2) a broad coalition to protect civilians; 3) Arab/Regional support; and, 4) a request for help from a credible Libyan opposition force.
Additionally, this request for help did not require U.S. ground forces to
intervene.
Meeting these criteria were the foundation for the success of military
intervention and the Libyan model. President Obama's decision to intervene also aligned with principles of the 2010 National Security Strategy's
(NSS) R2P objectives that state "the United States will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial,
36
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and—in certain instances—military means to prevent and respond to
genocide and mass atrocities."4 He further justified the use of military
force by stating, "When our interests and values are at stake, we have a
responsibility to act."5 In meeting these criteria, the President ensured
that the United States did not act alone nor intervene in a region that did
not ask for help. If the United States uses these criteria as a baseline for
future R2P scenarios, political and military leadership can avoid becoming trapped militarily in a conflict that is not in the country's best interest.

Libyan Conflict
The Arab Spring swept across Libya in late February 2010. The uprising
in Libya had a similar tenacity that the rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt
had, both of which caused a regime change. However, in Libya, General
Muammar Gadhafi was in his forty-second year of power and the Libyan
ruler was not going to give up without a fight.6 Gadhafi's use of force to
quell the Libyan uprising brought forth an international mandate, in the
form of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 that
authorized military intervention in Libya. Scenes of violence aired on
international news channels depicting protesters clashing with regime
forces in Benghazi. This was the first show of defiance by the people of
Libya, and in less than a month President Barack Obama would support
military intervention eventually leading to a 222-day North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign.7
With the approval of President Obama, an initial multinational coalition
led by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) entered Libyan airspace on
March 19, 2011 aimed at enforcing UNSCR 1973. Officially named Operation Odyssey Dawn, the mission's operational objectives in Libya focused
on stopping Gadhafi's forces from attacking civilians, forcing regime military troops back to their home bases and ensuring unrestricted humanitarian support was available for the people of Libya.8 On March 31, after
successfully suppressing the most capable strategic air defense systems in
Libya and establishing a no-fly zone, the mission transitioned command
and control to NATO under the name Operation Unified Protector.9
Despite Gadhafi's stubborn defiance, NATO aircraft continued to attack
regime forces in support of the Libyan rebels. On August 22, opposition
forces liberated the capital city of Tripoli. Opposition forces would eventually capture and kill Gadhafi on October 20. NATO ceased military
operations Operation Unified Protector on October 31, 2011.10 For President Obama, justification for military intervention hinged on the 2010
NSS R2P principles embedded in his vision for U.S. strategy. The Presi37
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dent, however, first ensured he met favorable criteria for U.S. intervention and did not respond with military force based solely on the tenets of
R2P.

Libyan Strategy/Model Defined
The Libyan model was a multilateral effort combining diplomatic and military power to achieve its objectives—intervention in the name of R2P.
Furthermore, the strategy taken by the United States and its allies used
limited means to accomplish an unlimited objective, the removal of General Muammar Gadhafi from power. Notably, the strategy was successful
by using only a limited portion of the United States' military capabilities,
air and sea power in order to aid NATO operations and an indigenous
opposition ground force. These limited means included the use of fighter
and bomber aircraft to target Libyan military facilities, command and
control centers, air defense sites, as well as Gadhafi's fielded military
forces.11 No foreign ground forces were committed in Libya, and NATO
took on a robust leadership role with European and Canadian allies leading Unified Protector.12 The U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for
Strategic Communications, Ben Rhodes, praised the Libyan model as the
key to future intervention operations for the Obama administration.13
Strengths of the Libyan model included an international mandate to protect civilians supported by a broad coalition that included Arab countries.
Furthermore, no foreign ground forces were used in the fight. The international mandate included UNSCR 1970, which encompassed global economic sanctions supported by the European Union, Russia, China, Japan
and South Korea. Final international approval and support for military
action came when the UNSC approved Resolution 1973, the establishment
of a no-fly zone over Libya, authorizing UN member states to take any
measures short of occupation to protect civilians under attack in Libya.14
The model's broad coalition included France, Italy, Britain and surrounding Arab nations, giving credibility to intervention and reinforcing a multilateral strategy to use military force against Gadhafi. Britain, Italy and
France publically advocated for intervention and led the NATO force after
the UNSC voted to authorize a no-fly zone.15 French President Sarkozy,
eager to prove France was still a force both politically and militarily in the
European Union, also supported intervention.16 Jordan, Qatar, and
Kuwait each lent support to the no-fly zone with military aircraft, providing additional regional legitimacy to the coalition's mission.17 The use of
NATO as the operational lead for Unified Protector also helped temper
the possible negative responses that a U.S.-unilateral military effort might
38
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cause. By taking a coalition approach in Libya, the United States shared
military responsibility and risk; ninety percent of the targets struck in
Libya were by non-U.S. aircraft.18
Most importantly, opposition forces held a geographically defendable
position in Libya. The opposition secured a main base of operations in
Benghazi, and had credible military leadership in control of opposition
forces. Opposition military leaders included officers who were defectors
from the Gadhafi regime, and these officers were actively leading opposition forces in battle. Opposition forces were also able to control military
facilities and had secured and held police stations in Libyan cities.
Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) leaders were also able to
meet outside the country with influential international leaders and solicit
support for the rebellion.19 Recognition by the Arab world, European
Union, and the United States brought legitimacy to the ITNC and its top
leadership.20 Because of this strong opposition force, the Libyan model
required no foreign ground forces or foreign occupation compared to previous U.S. conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 This was appealing to both
the American public and to Arab countries wary of an increased U.S. military presence in the region. Without credible opposition forces, the limited means approach of Unified Protector would not have succeeded in
stopping Gadhafi's regime forces nor would it have been successful in
forcing regime change.
The presence of a credible ground force, with a geographically defendable
position, provided air power a definable objective and a visible force to
support from the air. Comparing Kosovo, early Afghanistan, and Libya, it
is also apparent that each of these conflicts used air power to support a
credible ground force. The Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was capable
of establishing defendable bases allowing U.S. Special Forces to recruit
and rally opposition forces against the Taliban. Overall success against
the Taliban would not have been possible without the combination of precision air power with ground forces, able to fight for and secure territory.22 Similar to operations in Libya, both air and ground elements
combined to overthrow a hostile regime. Without both elements, major
American troop concentrations would have been required to achieve U.S.
objectives in both Afghanistan and Libya.23 The three conflicts noted in
Table 1 below possessed either a strong opposition force in the country, or
a strong opposition force aided by outside Special Forces or the threat to
use NATO ground forces. Table 1 is a comparative description of previous
campaigns in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. While each case was
unique, as the table shows, ground forces with a geographical base were
present in all three conflicts.
39
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Table 1: Contributing factors to the success of limited military intervention (1999–2011)
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Syria Crisis
In Syria, if the Obama administration exclusively applied the R2P principles discussed in the 2010 NSS, then U.S. leadership could decide to conduct military intervention in the name of human rights. However, before
engaging militarily in another humanitarian crisis, U.S. policymakers
should take each of the criteria used in Libya and apply them to the situation in Syria. By applying these criteria to Syria, it is evident that limited
military intervention similar to the Libya campaign model does not fit in
Syria. As a reminder, these criteria included an international mandate, a
broad coalition to protect civilians, regional support, and a request for
help from a credible opposition force.

Lack of an International Mandate
In Syria, there is no international mandate for military intervention in the
form of a UNSC resolution. Notably, both Russia and China have aggressively objected to sanctions and both countries voted to block a UNSC resolution that would have imposed economic sanctions against Syria. The
resolution, similar to UNSCR 1970 would have demanded that the Syrian
leader halt all violence against his people.31 Unlike in the Libya case, Russia sees Syria as one of the last strongholds for anti-American dominance
in the region, and Russia has both economic interests and a military partnership it wishes to protect in Syria.32 To emphasize this point, in November 2011, Russia deployed a carrier group to its base in Tartus, Syria,
displaying Russia's continued interest in the nation and support for President Assad.33 Without a UNSC resolution, a strong international mandate
will not form against Assad to the level seen against Gadhafi. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the UNSC will pass a resolution authorizing force
to provide international legitimacy for military action, as witnessed
against Libya.

Lack of a Broad Coalition/Support for Military Action
While international disapproval of Assad's actions has been robust, a
broad coalition supporting military force against his regime has not
formed. In Libya, the French, and British supported military action
against Gadhafi, and aggressively lobbied the United States to join a coalition that backed a no-fly zone.34 However, in Syria, France's ambassador
to the United Nations indicated previously that outside intervention in
Syria could result in an all-out civil war, believing that military intervention could put the whole region in jeopardy of turmoil.35 In addition, British Prime Minister David Cameron, a strong supporter for military
intervention in Libya, believes Syria is a different case and recently said,
41
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"In Libya there was a United Nations resolution and support from the
Arab League for action, whereas in the Syrian case there is neither."36
Without support from key NATO countries such Britain and France, formation of a broad military coalition will be difficult.
Furthermore, intervention in Syria would require a more robust military
effort than Libya, due to Syria's geography and defensive military capabilities.37 Countries in the region have not called for military intervention in
Syria with the exception of Turkey who has threatened Assad with military action.38 The geographic location of Syria, compared to Libya, would
require more logistical support for aircraft enforcing a no-fly zone, as
there are limited NATO bases in the region.

Lack of Arab Support
Economically and diplomatically, regional pressure is mounting against
Syria. The United States, along with the European Union and the Arab
League have passed wide-ranging sanctions against individuals and organizations in Syria. In fact, 19 of the Arab league's 22 member nations
approved sanctions ranging from a financial freeze on the Central Bank of
Syria, to a travel ban on Syrian government officials.39 However, Lebanon
and Iraq both voted against the Arab League sanctions and are not likely
to enforce serious economic restrictions.40 Right next door, Turkey's
Prime Minister Erdogan has publicly called for Assad to stop attacks
against his people and has continued to engage Assad in diplomatic negotiations hoping to halt the violence in Syria.41 Neighboring countries are
ramping up pressure against Assad on the economic and financial front.
However, the Arab League has not asked for military intervention and
surrounding countries have not demanded the enforcement of a no-fly
zone in comparison to the Libyan crisis.

Lack of a Credible Opposition Force
Syrian opposition leaders are pleading for help and asking for military
intervention similar to those called for in March 2011, by the Libyan
ITNC. On January 2, 2012, one exiled Syrian opposition leader and member of the opposition's Syrian National Council (SNC) executive board,
Samir Nashar, said a majority of SNC members support military action.
Nashar said the Syrian regime is worse than Gadhafi's regime, and Nashar
has publicly called for a no-fly zone over Syria. Nashar pointed to the fact
that Assad had not stopped his crackdown on dissent in Syria, even as
Arab League monitors were in the country assessing Assad's implementation of a peace plan.42
42
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Nevertheless, these cries for help have not come from a robust Syrian
opposition with a recognized and identifiable leader, nor have Syrian
opposition forces secured defensible territories or a home base.43 The
Syrian opposition lacks a base or territory where they can reorganize and
regroup, as the Libyan opposition did in the city of Benghazi. The Syrian
opposition does not seem to have a centralized command center and
opposition members are comprised of deserters and local militia with limited military weaponry. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has not shown the
capacity to keep and hold terrain in Syria, or organize under a credible
leadership structure, as was the case in Libya.44 In Libya, the fall of Benghazi to opposition forces gave the rebellion a home base of operations and
a defensible position.45 Table 1, shown earlier, depicted the need for a
credible ground force to supplement NATO air power, and was a key factor in NATO's success against Gadhafi. This is a significant part of the Libyan model and, without it, foreign ground forces would be required in
Syria or an air campaign may yield limited results.

Are These Criteria Too Stringent?
Some could argue that military intervention does not require an international mandate in a humanitarian crisis, such as Syria. The air war over
Kosovo is an example of military intervention without a UNSC resolution.
In Kosovo, there was no authorization from the UNSC for a no-fly zone to
stop the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Slobodan Miloševic. Russia
would not publicly support military intervention, but private conversations with Russian officials indicated that the Russians would not openly
oppose a NATO air campaign against Serbian forces.46 Thus, NATO initiated an air campaign and achieved its humanitarian objective to stop
Miloševic from killing innocent civilians before passing UNSCR 1244. In
the Syrian case, however, there is no indication from the Russians that
they would be willing to remain quiet, as they did in Kosovo, while NATO
takes military action against Syria. This is mainly because of the Russian
belief that NATO turned the no-fly zone into an excuse for regime change
in Libya. Since Russia's abstention from UNSCR 1973 paved the way for
military intervention in Libya, enforcement of a no-fly zone in Syria is a
showstopper for Russian officials.47
Some may also argue that the requirement for a credible opposition force
is not necessary to intervene with air power, and that only with air power
were Libyan opposition forces able to gain and maintain a stronghold in
Benghazi. Opposition forces in Benghazi were outgunned with limited
options in early March 2011 as Gadhafi's forces advanced toward the
city.48 As well, after Operation Odyssey Dawn began enforcement of the
43
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no-fly zone, Libyan opposition forces were able to hold their position,
repel regime forces, and eventually turn the tide of the rebellion. A visit
from U.S. Senator John McCain to Benghazi, coupled with the deployment of Predator drones and fighter aircraft attacking regime forces, are
what some may argue enabled opposition forces to gain the credibility
needed to overthrow Gadhafi. Some believe that the use of air power
alone was sufficient. However, in Libya, the air campaign started while
opposition forces were in control of a significant amount of territory.
Even before U.S. intervention, the opposition was able to repel regime
forces in Benghazi, and hold their ground, something Syrian opposition
forces have not thus far proved capable of achieving.
Additionally, some may disagree that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),
noted in Table 1, was a credible opposition force in Kosovo and that the
NATO air campaign accomplished its objectives, without the help of
opposition forces. Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, the former prime minister of Kosovo and chief of the KLA during the war, indicated this in
interviews. According to him, the KLA was unable to hold territory during
the war and used Albanian territory to regroup after military operations
failed against the Serb Army.49 While this may be true, it was not only the
presence of an opposition force in Kosovo, but the threat of NATO ground
forces by President Clinton that lent additional credibility to the opposition and enabled the success of the air campaign.50

Meeting the Criteria
By failing to meet the Libyan criteria in future humanitarian crises, the
United States may find itself enforcing a protracted no-fly zone similar to
the one used in Iraq following Desert Storm in 1991. During that time,
military forces in the region numbered around 20,000. This force
included the largest combined flying wing in the U.S. Air Force, and
required the presence of a dedicated carrier battle group with supporting
warships. This footprint caused U.S. relations in the Middle East to deteriorate in the late 1990s and increased U.S. security challenges in the
region.51 While the United States is trying to decrease its peripheral military commitments in the Middle East, the timing is not right for another
prolonged no-fly zone.
In the future, because of a smaller force driven by budget cuts, the United
States must be selective in its application of military force for human
rights efforts. Another protracted military operation would place a significant rotational demand on U.S. Forces. Nation building requires ground
forces to succeed and is a labor-intensive, expensive, and time-consuming
44

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss4/8
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.4.3</p>

Kildron: The Libyan Model and Strategy: Why it Won't Work in Syria

The Libyan Model and Strategy: Why it Won't Work in Syria

process.52 Without a clear, definable strategy with attainable criteria,
intervention in a humanitarian crisis without a "land force" option could
leave a NATO air campaign without achievable strategic objectives. Moreover, the opposition might fail and the United States may have to face the
embarrassment of extracting itself from a conflict, in failure. The United
States also cannot afford to act unilaterally in a region and risk becoming
involved in a protracted war that may hinder its planned withdrawal of
military forces from Afghanistan.

Conclusion
International support is vital to warrant military intervention in the name
of R2P, and each situation is unique. R2P principles call for military intervention anytime a national government cannot protect its people from
"large-scale losses of life or ethnic cleansing within its borders."53 However, as indicated by President Obama in the 2010 NSS, repressive acts by
a regime against its people do not always mandate the use of military
force, and the U.S. must consider "the costs and risks of action against the
costs and risks of inaction" when deciding possible military intervention.54 The key to the Libyan model lies in the multilateral approach
stated in the 2010 NSS, and not all states or regimes that raise the principles of R2P are candidates for military intervention.
While parts of the Libyan model are exportable, military intervention is
not a panacea for all humanitarian crises as conditions must be favorable,
with a high probability for success, before using military forces. Air power
alone, in support of R2P, should be selective and only used after meeting
the baseline criteria used in Libya. In the case of Libya, there was a legitimate international mandate, a broad coalition to protect civilians, support
from the Arab world, and an identified indigenous opposition force. Military intervention in Libya was only initiated after meeting a set of criteria
that minimized the likelihood of protracted military operations. U.S. military and political leaders, determined to invoke the principles of R2P in
the next humanitarian crisis, must ensure the previously defined criteria
are met. Otherwise, the U.S. military may find itself committed to a futile
air campaign unable to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives.
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